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Abstract. Rational beliefs are expectations which though consistent with empirical observations, may
deviate from the true underlying probability measure under which data is generated. This probability measure
is not necessarily stationary, but is required to fulﬁll a weaker condition, called WAMS. In the ﬁrst part of
this article we provide results on, as well as a decomposition of, WAMS measures and use this to demonstrate
that an agent that adopts a non-stationary rational belief is rationally overconﬁdent. Next we turn to deﬁning
various classes of WAMS stochastic processes which are suitable for equilibrium analysis. The most important
class consists of Markov processes on a continuous state space which do not have time invariant transitions
and are not stationary. To apply the theory to models of general equilibrium, we introduce the concept of a
sunspot rational beliefs structure which can be considered as the exogenously speciﬁed part of a state process
with rational beliefs. A part of the state space will be a set of sunspot variables which are not correlated
with fundamentals but will, in equilibrium, aﬀect prices and other endogenous variables. In contrast with
the traditional approach, we do not assume that the true distribution of sunspots and fundamentals is known
but only that agents hold rational, but diverse beliefs about these variables. Equilibria with sunspot rational
belief structures have some desirable properties like anonymity and conditional rationality. In the ﬁnal part
of this work we provide a simple example of the use of our results. We consider an inﬁnite state space model
where agents make production decision before knowing prices. Under rational beliefs, unlike under rational
expectations, mistakes persist even though all agents make forecasts that are statistically consistent with
the equilibrium process. Due to the correlation of subjective beliefs brought about by the sunspots, the
equilibrium exhibits excess price volatility.
JEL classiﬁcation number: C16, C62, C65, D50, D51, D84.
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Rational Belief Structures : Anonymity and Endogenous Uncertainty1 Introduction
It has been observed that even very sophisticated economic agents form expectations which diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from each other (see f.i. Kurz, 2002 and Taylor, 1995). In many cases these diverse expectations cannot
be explained by diversity of information. The other possible source of diversity of expectations among
rational agents is diﬀerent priors or diﬀerent models of the underlying reality. The assumption that all agents
have rational expectations, which is today predominant in all branches of economic theory, is based on the
postulate that empirical observations eventually lead all agents to have the same underlying model. Thus in
the rational expectations framework only the ﬁrst source of diverse opinions is left. This is unsatisfactory
for several reasons. Not only does it not square well with what we observe about agents’ expectations. At
a more fundamental level, it also ignores that (i) agents may be irrational and not use the available data in
a correct way (ii) even if agents are rational, convergence of the posteriors may be slow (i.e. learning takes
time) (iii) convergence may never happen in a non-stationary environment. In the rational beliefs framework
(originally deﬁned in Kurz, 1994a) the focus is on the last aspect of the learning process. A rather mild form
of non-stationary named stability is postulated under which an empirical distribution of observable variables
can still be derived from data, but where, unlike in the stationary case, this empirical distribution does not
uniquely identify the true underlying probability distribution of the data. Agents form beliefs which are
rational in the sense that these beliefs could have been generated by the empirical distribution that everyone
observes. However, since the identiﬁcation of the true distribution is not perfect, there is still left room for
diverse opinions.
Despite the strong assumptions that the economic environment is stable and that agents form rational
beliefs which are consistent with the empirical distribution, the behavior of the economy way be very diﬀerent
from what would be the case, if agents had rational expectations. As a consequence, the assumption that
agents have rational beliefs may be used to explain a host of phenomena that have been declared ’puzzles’
in the framework of rational expectations (see f.i. Kurz and Beltratti, 1997, Kurz and Motolese, 2001). The
assumption may also be used to enhance our understanding of the role of money and monetary policy (Kurz,
2002, Motolese, 2003) or such phenomena as speculation (Wu and Guo, 2003). Finally, it may become a
vehicle for studying public policy problems which have hitherto been left unnoticed and which cannot even
be posed in rational expectations models (Nielsen, 2003).
The theory of rational beliefs is also connected to a growing literature of economics based on studies of
patterns of behavior and reasoning among individuals. One of the repeated observations of this literature
is that many economic agents are showing overconﬁdence in their own abilities (see f.i. Camerer, 1999 and
Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998). In the context of expectations we argue that when agents
employ non-stationary rational beliefs, they exhibit overconﬁdence since they assume an ability to make
1predictions that are more precise than what the empirical distribution would suggest. While the many
empirical studies and experiments of the behavioral economics literature has convincingly demonstrated that
agents’ beliefs are diverse (and hence mutually inconsistent), there seems as yet not to be agreement within
this literature about what kind of beliefs we should expect agents to hold. In particular, there is often a
weak link between what agents are assumed to believe and what they observe1. In contrast, the theory
of rational beliefs proposes, as a priori requirements on agents’ expectations, that they are consistent with
empirical observations while retaining the possibility that they may not be correct. Thus overconﬁdence is
in our framework always rational that is, based on a subjective model that cannot be rejected by data.
When agents have rational beliefs, in general these beliefs are diverse and consequently not all agents
if any, use the correct belief as a basis for their decisions. Many of the just cited articles using the theory
of rational beliefs employ another important aspect of that theory, namely that rational beliefs tend to be
more volatile than rational expectations. If the volatility of the individual beliefs are somehow correlated
across agents (below we postulate that such correlation may be realized via sunspots) this volatility shows
up in macro data, for instance in prices. This ’endogenous’ volatility is added to the volatility stemming
from aggregate exogenous shocks and the end result is an economy with excess volatility as compared to the
situation where only exogenous shocks were the source of randomness.
As with rational expectations, the rational beliefs theory postulates that everything learnable has already
been learned. This is one important assumption that makes both of these models of expectations well suited
for general equilibrium analysis. A framework for proving existence of general equilibrium in models where
agents have diverse rational beliefs was formulated and put to use in Nielsen(1994) (see also Nielsen, 1996).
This framework, which has been used in numerous studies, sometimes in modiﬁed versions (see f.i., Kurz
and Schneider, 1996, Kurz and Wu, 1996 and Nielsen, 2003) has two components. One is a class of stable
but non-stationary stochastic processes ( SIDS or SSM processes as deﬁned later). The other component
is a so called Rational Beliefs Structure (RBS). In a rational beliefs equilibrium (RBE) (deﬁned in Kurz,
1994b) agents have expectations about endogenous and exogenous variables which are consistent with the
observed behavior of equilibrium values and these equilibrium values are in turn a consequence of the actions
of agents based on their rational beliefs. Rather than formulating the RBE as a ﬁxed point in a space of
beliefs (stochastic processes) it is convenient to formulate a structure of fundamentals, that is exogenous
variables and rational beliefs (about fundamentals and beliefs), and then show the existence of a equilibrium
point for a function between fundamentals and endogenous variables. In the resulting equilibrium agents
have rational beliefs about exogenous as well as endogenous variables.
This idea is extended in two directions. In Nielsen(1994) both SIDS and SSM processes were considered.
1As an example, see Scheinkmann and Xiong(2003) who like us, assume that agents have the same information but interpret
it diﬀerently (i.e. in terms of diﬀerent models).
2The latter are Markov chains with non-stationary transitions. However, their stability properties were only
proven for the case where the state space is countable. Here we extend the stability result to the case where the
state space is a measurable subset of a Euclidean space. The RBS of Nielsen(1996) had a conceptual weakness.
Because it is formulated for a ﬁnite number of agents each agent is necessarily ’big’ in such a framework,
causing the ﬂuctuations in his belief to show up in macro data like prices. Firstly, this dependence between
own belief and prices should be detected empirically and this makes the assumption that agents take prices
’as given’ less plausible. Secondly but highly related, when agents form expectations about future prices,
which in an RBS are formulated as beliefs about future beliefs, they end up forming beliefs about their own
future beliefs. The present work can be seen as a justiﬁcation for these simplifying assumptions made in the
earlier work. Here we work explicitly with a continuum of agents, so every individual is small (anonymous).
Furthermore, the aggregate ﬂuctuations generated by beliefs is a result of agents subjectively conditioning
their beliefs on sunspots. This is done in a way such that the rationality of their beliefs is preserved. Also,
in the RBS formulated here the future beliefs of any individual agent contains no information about future
ﬂuctuations in endogenous variables like prices. Another important aspect of this RBS is, that not only
do agents condition their beliefs on the publicly observed sunspots, they also form rational beliefs about
these sunspots. The dependence of prices on sunspots is in this way an imposed condition, and consequently
sunspot inﬂuence on prices may well arise in models where, if agents had rational expectations, this would
not be possible.
The present work considers most theoretical issues of relevance to rational beliefs. We present new results
on its mathematical foundation and on stochastic processes applicable to general equilibrium models with
rational beliefs as well as an example of how to apply the developed theory in a general equilibrium setting. As
a consequence, this paper is self-contained and can be read without any prior acquaintance with the literature
on rational beliefs. Section 2, to follow, starts out with a study of WAMS (or stable) probability measures
and, based on this, provides an elucidation and interpretation of the concept of rational beliefs. We then, in
Section 3, turn to presenting various results on the existence of classes of stochastic processes which are stable
but non-stationary. Most importantly we extend the concept of SSM processes to a continuous state space.
Section 4 is devoted to a discussion of how we may formally model the assumption that individual agents
are anonymous, but still in the aggregate, cause ﬂuctuations in endogenous variables via their beliefs. The
concept of Sunspot Rational Belief Structures with types is introduced and discussed by means of some simple
examples and then formally deﬁned. Also we discuss the issue of conditional stability and rationality, an issue
that becomes relevant in the context of Markovian beliefs. We show that structural independence (deﬁned
in Nielsen, 1994) is (almost) suﬃcient for rational beliefs to be conditionally rational. Section 5 applies the
developed framework to a simple general equilibrium model in the tradition of the cobweb model, where
agents make decisions about output before knowing market prices. Section 6 concludes. In the appendix we
3have collected certain proofs that we deemed to be similar to existing ones in the literature.
2 WAMS measures and rational beliefs
2.1 Preliminaries
The generic set of state variables is denoted S, a (Borel measurable) subset of <K. For any (Borel measurable)
set Y (in a topological space) we denote by B(Y ) the Borel ¾-algebra for Y. T : S1 ! S1 is the shift
transformation i.e. T(s1;s2;:::) = (s2;s3;:::) and letting º be a probability measure on (S1;B(S1)),
(S1;B(S1);º;T) becomes a dynamical system. We often denote a sequence in S1 by hsi. For a given
measure, º, Eº(¢) denotes the expectation operator under º. By ±s we denote the Dirac measure at s 2 S.
A set A 2 B(S1) is said to be invariant (T-invariant) if T ¡1A = A. We denote by I the set of invariant
sets in B(S1). The dynamical system (S1;B(S1);º;T) is said to be ergodic if any invariant set has either
measure 1 or measure 0. Finally, let C(S1) be the cylinders in B(S1) and let Cd(S1) be the d-dimensional
cylinders (in general, C(Y 1) is the set of cylinders in Y 1). By N, we denote the set of natural numbers and
1B;B 2 B(S1) is the indicator function, deﬁned on S1. Of the following deﬁnitions that of AMS is from
Gray and Kieﬀer(1980) while the other two are from Kurz(1994a):
Deﬁnition 1 Stability
The dynamical system (S1;B(S1);º;T) as well as the measure º are said to be stable if for all cylinders








jhsi) exists for º-a.a. hsi 2 S
1
Deﬁnition 2 WAMS and AMS
The dynamical system (S1;B(S1);º;T) as well as the measure º are said to be Weakly Asymptotic Mean




j=0 º(T ¡jC) exists. If the convergence is for
all measurable sets the system is said to be AMS (Asymptotic Mean Stationary)
One can show that (S1;B(S1);º;T) is stable if and only if it is WAMS, (Proposition 2 of Kurz, 1994a).








j=0 1C(T jhsi)º(dhsi) which converges by Lebesgue’s bounded convergence theorem.
The other implication is proved by using a suitably adjusted proof of Birkhoﬀ’s ergodic theorem.




j=0 º(T ¡jC) = º(C) (Proposition 3, Kurz, 1994). This can easily be established by noting that for




j=0 º(T ¡jC) is
a probability measure (a consequence of the Vitali-Hahn-Saks Theorem) and that the sequence fºdg1
d=1 is
4consistent such that the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem implies the existence of a probability measure º
on B(S1) (which when restricted to Cd(S1) is equal to ºd). We always use a bar over a stable measure to
denote the associated stationary measure. Note, that when the system is stationary, ¯ º = º .
The following example is worth having in mind, when one wants to understand the notion of stability and
prove results involving it.
Example 1
A sequence of probability measures f¹ng and a probability measure ¹, all on (the Borel subsets of) [0;1),
and a countable generating ﬁeld, F, s.t. ¹n(F) ! ¹(F), 8F 2 F, but for some A 2 ¾(F) = B([0;1)), ¹n(A)
does not converge to ¹(A).
Let ¹n = ± 1
n and let ¹ = ±0. Note that then ¹n converges to ¹ in the topology of weak convergence. Finally,
let F = f[N
n=1[q
n; ¯ qn) : N 2 N;q
n; ¯ qn are rationals in [0;1)g. Then note that ¹n(f0g) = 0 does not converge
to ¹(f0g) = 1
2.2 Decomposition of WAMS probability measures
Lemma 1










1;d 2 N;N 2 N









is well deﬁned for all N and d and, calling this limit ad
N(hsi), that for all d, aN(hsi) ! 0 as N ! 1.
Proof: Since º is WAMS, for º a.a. hsi the limit is well deﬁned for all N and d. Suppose, for some d that the
rest of the lemma did not hold. There would be a set B 2 B(S1) with º(B) > 0 and ² > 0 s.t. for hsi 2 B
we have ad






















jhsi)º(ds) ¸ º(B)²; 8N
But º(Ad
N) ! 0 as N ! 1, a contradiction
The following proposition is an extension of Proposition 2 of Nielsen(1996).
5Proposition 1
Suppose S is countable (= fs1;s2;:::g and that º is WAMS. Then for º a.a. hsi 2 S1 there is a stationary






jhsi) ! Phsi(C);8C 2 C(S
1) (1)
Proof: Let the ﬁeld ˜ Cd ½ Cd(S1) consist of ;, S1 as well as all d-dimensional cylinders of the form Cd £S1
where Cd ½ Sd is ﬁnite or coﬁnite. We have ¾(˜ Cd) = Cd(S1) and, since ˜ Cd is countable, that for º a.a. hsi
there is a function ˜ Phsi : [1










We also have for º a.a hsi that









jhsi) = 0 (3)
The last claim is a consequence of Lemma 1 since if fCng # ; with Cn 6= ;;8n we have for all N that 9n
s.t. n > n ) Cn ½ Ad
N. It follows that for º a.a. hsi, ˜ Phsi(Cn) ! 0 if fCng # ; in ˜ Cd. Because of this and
since ˜ Phsi is obviously ﬁnitely additive it is then also countably additive on ˜ Cd. Thus there is for each d a
unique extension of ˜ Phsi restricted to ˜ Cd to a probability measure, P d
hsi on Cd(S1) (Caratheodory’s Extension
Theorem). Since the resulting sequence, fP d
hsig1
d=1 is consistent we have by Kolmogorov’s extension theorem
that there is a probability measure Phsi on (S1;B(S1)) that is consistent with fP d
hsig1
d=1.
Let C 2 C(S1). There are Cn # C and Cn " C, with Cn;Cn 2 [1













jhsi) ¸ Phsi(Cn);8n (4)
and by continuity from above and below in the limit, as n ! 1 all inequalities in ( 4 ) hold as equalities
For this countable case we call a sequence hsi, for which there is convergence to Phsi for all cylinders C,
º-typical.
When the state space is not countable there will in general not be convergence of the empirical frequency
for all cylinders. In order to derive a probability measure, Phsi which, like in the countable case, is based on
the empirical frequencies of a countable set of cylinders we introduce the notion of a so called standard ﬁeld2.
2In Gray(1987) standard ﬁelds are uses to generate an empirical distribution for AMS measures. The concept of standard
ﬁelds originates with Christensen(1974).
6Deﬁnition 3 Standard Field
A ﬁeld F ½ B(S1). is said to be standard if there is a sequence fFng of ﬁnite ﬁelds s.t.
(i) Fn " F
(ii) If fAng is a decreasing sequence of sets, where, for each n, An is a non-empty atom of Fn then \1
n=1An 6= ;
Deﬁnition 4 Standard measurable space
A measurable space (Ω;B) is said to be standard if there is a standard ﬁeld, F that generates B (i.e. ¾(F) = B)
Deﬁnition 5 Countable extension property for a ﬁeld
A ﬁeld F in B is said to have the countable extension property if every non-negative, ﬁnitely additive set
function, P deﬁned on F with P(Ω) = 1 is also countably additive
The following theorems are respectively Theorem 2.6.1 and Theorem 3.3.1 of Gray(1987)
Theorem 1
A ﬁeld has the countable extension property if and only if it is standard
Theorem 2
If Ω is a complete, separable, metric space then (Ω;B(Ω)) is standard
It is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.3.1 of Gray(1987), that if S is a complete, separable, metric space
then there is a countable standard ﬁeld F ½ C(S1) such that ¾(F) = B(S1). Thus when S = <N and
(S1;B(S1);T;º) is WAMS, the empirical distribution for a given realization hsi is derived by looking at the
frequencies of members of a countable standard generating ﬁeld, F. Speciﬁcally, we have for º a.a. hsi that








jhsi) = ˜ Phsi(C);8C 2 F (5)
Because F is standard, ˜ Phsi is also countably additive and thus has a unique extension to a probability
measure Phsi on B(S1). Associated with a realization hsi is then the empirical distribution Phsi. The use of
the deﬁnite article here is justiﬁed by proposition 2 and its corollary to follow. Deﬁne for C 2 B(S1), AC =
fhsi 2 S1 : 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) converges as J ! 1g.
Lemma 2
Suppose º is WAMS and that for some B 2 B(S1) we have º(B) > 0. Deﬁne ˆ º on B(S1) by ˆ º(A) =
º(A\B)
º(B) .
Then ˆ º is WAMS.




Suppose º is WAMS and let F be a standard generating ﬁeld consisting of cylinders. Let Phsi be the empirical
distribution associated with F and hsi. If C 2 C(S1) then for º a.a. hsi 2 S1 : 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) ! Phsi(C).









jhsi) ¡ Phsi(C) > ² (6)
Let ˆ º on B(S1) be deﬁned by ˆ º(A) =
º(A\B)













B Phsiˆ º(dhsi) is a probability measure (P(S1) = 1, P is obviously ﬁnitely additive and if An # ;
then since Phsi(An) ! 0 for all hsi, we have P(An) ! 0). Finally note that P and ˆ º agree for all F 2 F,
which implies that they are identical and this is in contradiction with ( 6 )
Corollary 1
If º is WAMS and if ˜ C is a countable set of cylinders, then there is for each hsi 2 S1 a probability measure






jhsi) ! Phsi(C);8C 2 ˜ C
We next study the measures Phsi in more detail. First we show that they are ergodic.
Lemma 3



































jhsi) ! Phsi(C);8C 2 ˜ C













jhsi) ! Phsi(C);8C 2 ˜ C
8so we have Phsi(T ¡1C) = Phsi(C);8C 2 ˜ C which implies stationarity of Phsi.






¡jC \ C) ! Phsi(C)


































KPhsi(C)±hsi(T ¡kC) = Phsi(C)2 so ( 7 ) holds
Note, that the assumption that C 2 ˜ C ) T ¡1C 2 ˜ C is innocuous by Proposition 2.
Remark 1
The preceding propositions provide a strengthening of Proposition 4 of Kurz(1994), since we can use them
to conclude that for any WAMS system (S1;B(S1);¹;T) we have for ¹ a.a. hsi an associated ergodic
stationary system (S1;B(S1);T;Phsi) that is derived from the empirical frequencies generated by hsi
The following proposition shows the equivalent of Birkhoﬀ’s Ergodic Theorem for WAMS probability
measures.
Proposition 4












j=0 1C(T jhsi) if this limit exists, P(C)(hsi) = º(C) else.
Then for º a.a. hsi: 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) ! P(C)(hsi). Also for any interval (a;b] with rational endpoints
(there are countably many such) fhsi : P(C)(hsi) 2 (a;b]g 2 I, so P(C) is measurable I. By Birkhoﬀ’s
Ergodic Theorem, for º a.a. hsi : 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) ! º(CjI)(hsi). We conclude that P(C) is a version of
º(CjI)(hsi)
We next report a result on the relationship between º and º.
Proposition 5
If º is WAMS and ergodic, º is ergodic.




j=0 1C(T jhsi) = º(C)
for º a.a. hsi. In other words, Phsi = º for º a.a. hsi. But Phsi is ergodic
An implication in the other direction does not hold (Example 2, below). To see this (and for other
purposes) it is useful to consider the smallest invariant sets in S1.
9Deﬁnition 6
Let hsi 2 S









Proof: For every j, T ¡1([1
k=0T ¡k(T jhsi) = [1
k=1T ¡k(T jhsi) ½ [1
k=0T ¡k(T jhsi) ½ Ihsi. So T ¡1Ihsi ½ Ihsi
That Ihsi ½ T ¡1Ihsi follows from the fact that for each j, T jhsi 2 T ¡1(T j+1hsi) ½ T ¡1Ihsi
Let S be countable and let P be the set of stationary and ergodic probability measures on (S1;B(S1)).
Suppressing reference to S we deﬁne for any P 2 P







jhsi) ! P(C) as J ! 1;8C 2 C(S
1)g
Then let IP = ¾(fKP : P 2 Pg). Since KP 2 I, IP ½ I. When S is not countable we deﬁne for any
stationary and ergodic probability measure P on S1 and for any countable (generating) set ˜ C of cylinders,







jhsi) ! P(C) as J ! 1;8C 2 ˜ Cg
KP(˜ C) is invariant and deﬁning I(P;˜ C) = ¾(fKP(˜ C) : P 2 Pg) we have I(P;C) ½ I.
Remark 2
(i) Suppose that for some hsi 2 S1, that T jhsi = T khsi for some k > j and that T jhsi 6= T hhsi for all
j < h < k. So T j+mhsi = T k+mhsi, 8m ¸ 0. In particular we have for n = 1 that
T
j+mhsi = T
j+n(k¡j)+m; 8m ¸ 0 (8)
But if ( 8 ) holds for n, it also holds for n + 1, since T j+mhsi = T j+n(k¡j)+mhsi = T k+n(k¡j)+mhsi=





for m = 1;2;:::;k ¡ j
This implies, on the other hand, that if P is any stationary and ergodic probability measure with a marginal
on S that either has a non-ﬁnite support or else is non-deterministic then we have for P a.a. hsi that
T
jhsi 6= T
khsi for j 6= k (9)
(ii) If ( 9 ) holds for hsi there is B 2 B(S1) s.t. limsup 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1B(T jhsi) > liminf 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1B(T jhsi). B can







10(iii) In the countable case, if (S1;B(S1);T;º) is WAMS, then for º a.a. hsi, ±hsi is WAMS (but in general
not AMS as was just demonstrated). This is in particular the case if the dynamical system is actually
stationary. Based on a particular realization hsi there is no way to see whether the dynamical system, that
hsi is a realization of, is stationary, AMS or WAMS. In all cases the empirical frequency will converge for all
cylinders but not for all inﬁnitely dimensional sets.
(iv) When S is not countable, in general, ±hsi is not WAMS for a.a. hsi. To see this take a WAMS, ergodic
probability measure ¹ for which ¹1, the marginal of ¹ on S does not have a countable support. ¹1 has at
most countably many atoms, let A ½ S be the set consisting of them. Let J ½ C1(S1) be the countable set
of one-dimensional cylinders with rational endpoints and let H = fhsi : 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1E(T jhsi) ! ¹(E);8E 2 Jg,
so ¹(H) = 1. Now let F ½ SnA be ﬁnite. There is for all ² > 0 a ﬁnite collection fEng in J s.t. [En ½ SnF









j=0 1F£S1(T jhsi) = 0 for hsi 2 H.
We can use this observation to construct for º a.a. hsi a cylinder C such that 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) does not






























and so on. Letting C = [Cj £ S1 we have the desired non convergence.
Note that also for the uncountable case are we unable to detect whether the underlying dynamical system
is stationary, AMS or just WAMS, since in all cases an empirical distribution can be derived, but there are
cylinders for which the empirical frequency does not converge.
(v) For any stationary and ergodic probability measure P, P(KP) = 1, P(KP(˜ C)) = 1 in the countable and
uncountable case respectively (see proof of Proposition 5).
Example 2 º is not ergodic, but º is.
Let S be countable and let hs0i 2 KP where P is non-trivial, stationary and ergodic. By the previous
remark there is B 2 B(S1) s.t. 1
J
PJ¡1




j=0 1B(T jhsi) does converge. So there is hs00i 2 KP s.t. Ihs0i 6= Ihs00i. Then let º0 = ¸±hs0i + (1 ¡ ¸)±hs00i
with ¸ 2 (0;1). Since º0(Ihs0i) = ¸, º0 is not ergodic but º0 = P is ergodic3
Remark 3
Under the conditions of Example 2, we have ±hs0i(Ihs0i) = 1. But, since P(T ¡k(T jhs0i)) = 0;8k;j, we have
P(Ihs0i) = 0. This observation should be compared with Lemma 6.3.1 of Gray(1987) which states that if
(S1;B(S1);T;º) is AMS then º(I) = º(I); 8I 2 I.
Lemma 5
Let P be stationary and ergodic. If º is a stationary measure with º(KP) = 1 (in the uncountable case,
º(KP(˜ C) = 1,where ˜ C is a countable generating ﬁeld), then º = P.
Proof: For º a.a. hsi: 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) ! º(CjI)hsi (Birkhoﬀ’s Ergodic Theorem). However we also have,
by deﬁnition of KP (KP(˜ C)) that for all hsi 2 KP (2 KP(C)) that 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jhsi) ! P(C). Hence for all
cylinders C (all cylinders C 2 ˜ C) we have º(CjI)hsi = P(C) for º a.a. hsi and the result follows
Lemma 6
Suppose (S1;B(S1);T;º) is WAMS and that º ¿ º. Then º is AMS.
Proof: For B 2 B(S1) we have that for º a.a. hsi, 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1B(T jhsi) converges. But then there is also
convergence for º a.a. hsi
Lemma 7
Suppose fº®g®2A is a collection of WAMS probability measures on (S1;B(S1)) and let ½ be a probability
measure on A. Then º =
R
A º®½(d®) is a WAMS probability measure.
Proof: For a cylinder C, we have º®(AC) = 1;8® 2 A, hence º(AC) = 1 also
With the help of the results stated in this section it becomes easier to understand the relationship between
stationary, AMS and WAMS probability measures. Let us ﬁrst consider the ergodic case. Concentrating on
the case where S is countable, a stationary ergodic probability measure P has support on KP. If ¹ is AMS
with support on KP then if ¹(I) = 1 for some I 2 I, P(I) = 1. We may still have P(B) = 0 and ¹(B) = 1
for some measurable B ½ KP. But then (Corollary 6.3.2 of Gray, 1987)
lim
j!1¹(T
¡jB) = 0 (10)
If º is ergodic, WAMS but not AMS with support on KP then there is (Lemma 6) some invariant set I ½ KP
s.t ¹(I) = P(I) = 0 while º(I) = 1, in particular ( 10 ) does not hold. In this sense, we say that the support
3In the following section we deﬁne probability measure (SIDS measures and SSM measures) that are WAMS, not AMS and
ergodic with support on some KP(˜ C). Convex combinations of these will then be non-ergodic.
12of º is smaller than that of ¹ and P. This can be phrased in another way: For any ¾-algebra G ½ B(S1), we
have that P(¢jG)hsi is a WAMS probability measure for P a.a. hsi. The same kind of interpretation applies
to the case where S is not countable.
In the non-ergodic case, and again considering the case where S is countable, a stationary probability
measure P can be interpreted as a combination of ergodic stationary measures namely P(¢jIP) (by Lemma 5,
since these are all stationary and with support on KP0 for some P 0) and similarly if º is WAMS it is a
combination of WAMS measures, namely º(¢jIP) and a combination of ergodic WAMS measures, namely
º(¢jI) (this follows from Remark 2,(iii)). When S is not countable, P(¢jIP) is still stationary, however
whether º(¢jIP) is WAMS, is an open question to this author. Certainly, º(¢jI) is in general not (Remark 2).
In any event, º has a much ”smaller” support than P when P = º and this is the crucial observation that
we use when interpreting rational beliefs, as deﬁned below (Deﬁnition 7).
Below, we usually assume that the true probability measure º and hence ¯ º is ergodic, implying that
º(KP0) = ¯ º(KP0) = 1, for some P 0 2 P. This is without loss of generality, since it just means that we





j=0 1C(T jhsi) = ¯ º(C) for º-a.a. hsi (Kurz, 1994 Corollary to Proposition 3).
2.3 Rational beliefs
Whether the true probability measure º is ergodic or not, agents are assumed to know the limit empirical
frequencies for many cylinders C and based on this information they get to know ¯ º (in the ergodic case,
else ¯ º(¢jI)hsi). The assumption that all agents know ¯ º is entirely the same as that of rational expectations
models (f.i. in Lucas, 1978). This can, in an environment where the relevant observable variables on which
agents form expectations are stable, and where consequently the empirical distribution exists, be justiﬁed as
an approximation. Thus we suggest, in line with many interpretations of the rational expectations hypothesis
that the knowledge about ¯ º is the result of a learning process which is not explicitly modelled. However,
in models like Lucas(1978) one more assumption, which is not even explicated, is made, namely that not
only is the true process of observable variables stationary but agents know this. Contrary to the assumption
just discussed, this one cannot be justiﬁed as something agents will learn in the limit. As Remark 2 showed,
there is no way to discern whether a system is stationary and not just stable4. When agents realize that the
system may not be stationary, they are faced with diﬀerent possible interpretations of what they see in terms
of underlying statistical models. To know that some unknown dynamical system (S1;B(S1);º;T) generates
¯ º is not the same as knowing º . There are many possible stable dynamical systems that will generate the
4Of course, since in practice we only have a ﬁnite number of observations, we can never be absolutely sure, whether there is
convergence of the empirical frequency of a particular set B. However, note that if B is an inﬁnite dimensional set, the empirical
frequency is not even deﬁned when the number of observations is ﬁnite.
13same stationary measure.
Deﬁnition 7 Weakly Rational Belief.
A stable probability measure ¹ on (Ω;B) is said to be a Weakly Rational Belief for the stable dynamical
system (S1;B(S1);º;T) if ¯ ¹ = ¯ º
This deﬁnition is a slight modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition of a rational belief given in Kurz(1994a) and in the
following we will not diﬀerentiate between the two notions and simply refer to weakly rational beliefs as
rational beliefs.
The true realization is hsi and what we basically assume, is that the agent knows to which of the subsets
KP (or KP( ˜ C) in the uncountable case), hsi belongs, say KP0. Any distribution ¹, with ¹(KP0) = 1 is then
a rational belief.
Remark 4
(i) To understand this reasoning, consider the possibility (assuming S countable) that the agent chooses as his
belief, ±hs0i where hs0i 2 KP0. This is a very extreme rational belief, since it means that the agent is absolutely








q=t+1 belong to ffsqg1
q=t+1 : (s1;:::;st;st+1;st+2;:::) 2 KP0g. Thus there is no logical reason for
him to think that fs0
qg1
q=t+1 and fsqg1
q=t+1 would be diﬀerent in the future, i.e. no logical reason for him to
change his belief as far as the future is concerned. The same reasoning would be applicable, would he have
a more diﬀuse belief on KP0 like an SIDS process as deﬁned below (Deﬁnition 8). Finally, note that as time
progresses it will be conﬁrmed to the agent that hsi 2 KP0, that is no new learning takes place. If, in contrast
the agent’s belief was wrong in the sense that he thought hsi 2 KP00 (P 0 6= P 00), and had chosen some ¹ with
support on KP00 then, as the empirical frequencies would converge to P 0, he would learn that his belief was
mistaken and would, if he is rational, change it.
(ii) Inﬁnity plays a crucial role in Deﬁnition 7. An agent may have any belief in the ﬁrst n periods of his life
and still be rational in the long run5. This may be considered a problem, however it resembles the heuristics
used to explain the rational expectations assumption according to which agents cannot continue to have
mistaken beliefs, i.e. cannot be wrong in the long run. Furthermore, any statement about the properties of
a rational belief equilibrium is about what happens in the long run, typically based on the properties of the
empirical distribution of the equilibrium process.
(iii) If an agent picks a WAMS belief ¹ (for instance the belief ±hs0i considered above) which is diﬀerent from
P 0 he demonstrates rational overconﬁdence. This is most evident when this belief is not AMS (as is the case
5However, the concept of rational beliefs only deﬁne what beliefs agents can have. Which particular rational beliefs they
actually have is seen from the perspective of the theory an empirical issue.
14for the beliefs studied in this paper) since then the support of ¹, H¹ ½ KP0 has zero probability under P 0.
Despite, that there are no empirical reasons to think that the actual realization, hsi belongs to H¹, the agent
is conﬁdent that it does. In other words, while his belief is consistent with observations, he thinks he knows
more than what can safely be extracted from these observations. In particular, he holds that his ability to
predict outperforms that of other agents (who employ other rational beliefs)6. On the other hand, adopting
P 0 (the empirical distribution) as one’s belief is a conservative strategy, since it implies that no subjective
model is used to interpret the data that has been observed
(iv) We would not claim that in reality agents know the empirical distribution perfectly well. Learning
certainly takes place all the time. But part of the problem that individual agents are faced with in reality is,
that they cannot assume that other agents use the same learning model as they do. The diversity of models
and the resulting uncertainty about the expectations of other agents is central to the theory of rational beliefs
(see Section 5 for more on this). To model how learning takes place in general equilibrium is an important
but also diﬃcult task. Guidolin and Timmermann(2003) show how this may be accomplished, but one
shortcoming of their approach is the assumption of homogeneous learning models and common knowledge
about this homogeneity. One can only hope that the methods and insights from both the learning approach
and from the literature on rational beliefs will eventually be incorporated into one general model
3 SSM processes
SSM-processes were introduced in Nielsen(1994) for the case of a countable state space. They are a class
of Markov processes which are stable but not necessarily time homogeneous. The principle is the same as
for SIDS processes, in fact, a subset of SIDS processes, which we called SIDS(i.i.d.) processes7, are SSM
processes. The distribution of an SSM process is generated by an initial distribution and a sequence of
transition probabilities, the last being a typical realization of an i.i.d. process taking values in a countable
set of transition probabilities. To compare, let us formally deﬁne SIDS measures (introduced in Nielsen, 1994
and 1996).
Deﬁnition 8 SIDS measure.
An SIDS measure º on (S1;B(S1)) is a probability measure s.t.
(a) º = ­1
t=1Pt where 8t;Pt is a probability measure on (S;B(S)) .
6The concept of rational overconﬁdence could, in principle, be employed in other contexts than that of rational beliefs. The
ingredients would be a set of probability distributions, one conservative, the rest ”bold” where all these are consistent with
the empirical distribution (empirical observations). Overconﬁdent agents would then choose a bold distribution, while cautious
agents would choose the conservative distribution.
7Meaning that that the generating measure Q = £1
j=1q where q is a probability measure on S.
15(b) Let P = [tfPTg and write it as P = fP 1;P 2;:::g. Let Z : P ! N with Z(P k) = k . Then there exists










t=1)) ! Q(C) as J ! 1 (11)
Q is then called the generating measure for º
An SIDS measure is ergodic and stable (see Nielsen, 1996). The stationary measure ¯ º associated with
(S1,B(S1),º,T) is described by
8D 2 N;8C 2 C
D(S












where CD is the projection of C on SD and n(D) denotes a vector in N D. We also have that for Q-a.a. hni
that ­1
t=1Z¡1(nt) is an SIDS measure with the same associated stationary distribution as º.
We provide a formal deﬁnition of SSM processes which is compatible with an uncountable state space.
Whenever we have a sequence of transition probabilities fΠtg1
t=1 on a state space S and an initial distribution
¹, we let °(¹;fΠtg1
t=1) denote the induced measure on (S1;B(S1)). If the Πt’s are all the same, equal
to Π, we simply write °(¹;Π). If °(¹;fΠtg1
t=1) is WAMS, the associated stationary measure is denoted
¯ °(¹;fΠtg1
t=1).
Deﬁnition 9 SSM Processes and Generating Measure
An SSM measure on the state space S is a probability measure ¹ on (S;B(S)) and a sequence fΠtg1
t=1 where
for each t, Πt : S £ B(S) ! < is a transition probability s.t.
(i) The Markov process with distribution °(¹;fΠtg) is WAMS.
(ii) There is a probability measure q on P ´ [1






t=1) ! Q(C) as J ! 1. Q is then said to be the generating measure for ¹.
The associated canonical stochastic process is then called an SSM process
We write the countable set P deﬁned in condition (ii) as P = fΠ1;Π2;:::g. The following result was then
proved in Nielsen(1994):
Proposition 6
Suppose that the state space S is countable. Let P be a countable set of transition probabilities (matrices)
on S and q a probability measure on P. Suppose that there is an invariant ergodic measure, ¯ ¹ for ¯ Π =
P1
i=1 q(fΠig)Πi. Let ¹ ¿ ¯ ¹. Then for Q a.a. fΠtg1
t=1, °(¹;fΠtg) is an SSM process
Another route to this result uses a Conditional Stability Theorem like the one introduced in Kurz and
Schneider(1996). We state and prove a slightly diﬀerent version of that theorem.
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Let S be countable and Y a topological space. Suppose that (S1 £ Y 1;B(S1 £ Y 1);T;º) is a stable and
ergodic dynamical system. Let the sub algebra G ½ B(S1 £ Y 1) consist of sets of the form G = S1 £ B,
where B 2 B(Y 1) and suppose that º(¢jG)(¢) is a regular conditional probability. For given hs;yi 2 S1£Y 1
let ºS(¢jG)(hs;yi) be the marginal of º(¢jG)(¢)(hs;yi) on S1. (a) For º a.e. hs;yi, ºs(¢jG)(hs;yi) is WAMS
with associated stationary measure equal to ¯ ºS (the marginal of ¯ º on S1). (b) If Y is countable we have for
º a.a. hs;yi that º(¢jG)hs;yi is WAMS with associated stationary measure ¯ º.
Proof: Let






jhsi) ! ¯ º(C);8C 2 C(S
1)g
and






jhs;yi) ! ¯ º(C);8C 2 C((S £ Y )
1)g
Then by Proposition 1, ºS(KS) = 1 (since ºS is stable) and if Y is countable, º(K) = 1. Now suppose
there were a set B 2 B(S1 £ Y 1) s.t. º(B) > 0 and s.t. for all hs;yi 2 B : º(KS £ Y 1jG)(hs;yi)





(S1£Y 1)nB º(KS £ Y 1jG)(hs;yi)dº(hs;yi) and since º(KS £ Y 1jG)(hs;yi) · 1
uniformly, this would give a contradiction. Thus ºS(KSjG)(hs;yi) = 1 for º a.a. hs;yi which means that
ºS(¢jG)(hs;yi) is stable with associated stationary measure ¯ ºS. Using K in stead of KS, the same kind of
reasoning leads to (b) when Y is countable
Remark 5 How to obtain Proposition 6 from Proposition 7.
Let Y = P (from (ii) of Deﬁnition 9). Let the Markov transition on S £ Y be Π((s;Πj);A £ fΠi)) =
Πj(s;A)q(Πi) for all A ½ S (with a unique extension to all sets in B((S £Y )1)). Let the initial distribution
be ¹­q. Then °(¹­q;Π) is stationary and ergodic and for Q a.a. fΠtg in P1 we have °(¹;fΠtg) is stable
and ergodic with associated stationary distribution equal to °(¯ ¹; ¯ Π), which is the marginal of °(¯ ¹­q; ¯ Π) on
S1 (see Proposition 10 for details)
As we shall demonstrate shortly, the result is not correct for S uncountable even when Y is ﬁnite. However the
conditions stated in Proposition 7 have their own relevance. In fact, in Kurz(1997) a situation is studied, where
the ﬂuctuations in endogenous variables are partly the consequence of a series of regimes which never repeat
themselves. This may be interpreted as a situation where the set Y of generating variables is uncountable.
We now turn to demonstrating the limitations of the conditional stability approach. This is done by showing
that if S is uncountable, the conclusion of Proposition 7 need not hold.
17Example 3
Let Y = f1;2g and let ° = ­1
t=1°1 where °1(f0g) = °1(f1g) = 1
2. Then (Y 1;B(Y 1);T;°) is a stationary
system and by the Ergodic Theorem we have for all B 2 B(Y 1) that for °-a.a. hyi 2 Y 1, 1
J
PJ¡1
j=1 1B(T jhyi) !







jhyi) ! °(C) for all C 2 C(Y
1) (Proposition 1)







jhyi) does not converge (Remark 2)
Let S = [0;1] and let E 2 B(Y 1) be the set of hyi s.t. either yn = 1;8n or 8k;9n > k, s.t. yn = 0. Then the




2n is a one-to-one map from Y 1 onto S and is continuous (in the topology
of pointwise convergence on Y 1 ). Now deﬁne the injective map f : E ! S1 by f(hyi)n = ¿(T n¡1hyi).
Also deﬁne the transition probability Π : E ! P(S1) by Π(hyi) = ±f(hyi) (the Dirac measure at f(hyi)). To
establish that Π is a transition probability we need to show that it is measurable. We show continuity. Let
hyik ! hyi pointwise in E. So for any n, T nhyik ! T nhyi pointwise that is f(hyik)n+1 ! f(hyi)n+1 for all
n. Finally, we know that when hsik ! hsi we have ±hsik ! ±hsi (in the topology of weak convergence). So
Π is indeed a transition probability. Let °E be the restriction of ° to E and note that since °(E) = 1, °E is
a probability measure. Then °E together with Π induces a probability measure º on (S1 £ E;B(S1 £ E))
(deﬁned by º(A £ B) =
R
B °E(dhyi)Π(hyi;A) ) s.t. if we let D = fhs;yi 2 S1 £ E : hsi = f(hyi)g then
º(D) = 1 . For °E a.a. hyi we have that the probability measure Π(hyi) is not stable since we can construct
a cylinder C 2 C(S1) s.t. f(hyi) is not stable relative to C, that is 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1C(T jf(hyi)) does not converge.
This is done as follows. We use that for °-a.a. hyi we have that T jhyi 6= T j+nhyi for all n > 0, which
means that (T jf(hyi))1 6= (T j+nf(hyi))1 for n > 0 (Remark 2). Then let K ½ [0;1] be deﬁned as follows:
K = [1
n=1 [102n+1
m=102n f(T mhsi)1g where hsi = f(hyi) and let C = K £ S1. Then f(hyi) is not stable relative
to C. Note that C is the smallest 1-dimensional cylinder containing [1
n=1 [102n+1
m=102n fT mhsig. The preimage of
this last set under f is not a cylinder, which explains how this example works. The idea is to let the inﬁnite
dimensional information contained in the sequence hyi be transformed into ﬁnite dimensional information as
















Then to show that º(KF) = 1 we need only show that º(KF \ D) = 1. We show
hs;yi 2 KF \ D iﬀ hs;yi 2 KF\D \ D (13)
18First note that hs;yi 2 D , T jhs;yi 2 D;8j 2 N0. It follows that if hs;yi 2 D then T jhs;yi 2 F )













from which ( 13 ) follows. Suppose T jhyi 2 ProjY(F \D). Then 9hsi 2 S1 s.t. (hsi;T jhyi) 2 F \D. But if
(hsi;T jhyi) 2 D then hsi = f(T jhyi). So T jhf(hyi);yi = (f(T jhyi);T jhyi) 2 F \ D. We conclude that
T
jhf(hyi);yi 2 F \ D , T














which converges for °E-a.a.hyi and thus for º-a.a. hs;yi 2 D.
Finally, consider an invariant set, I. Then the projection, IE on E is also invariant, so either °E(IE) = 1
or °E(IE) = 0. In the ﬁrst case, I = fhf(hyi);yi : hyi 2 IEg, so º(I) = 1.
Remark a: ºS1, the marginal of º on S1 is the distribution of a Markov chain fXtg with initial distribution
being the uniform distribution on [0;1] and deterministic transition ¼ where, letting h(s) = ¿(T(¿¡1(s))),
¼(s;fh(s)g) = 1. Suppose we consider the sub ¾-algebra H ½ B(S1) generated by all sets of the form
A1 £ A2 £ ::: £ AN £ S1 where An 2 f[0; 1
2);[1
2;1]g;8n s.t. 1 · n · N. Thus H is deﬁned by a ﬁnite
partition at any date. None the less, ºS1(¢jH)hsi = Π(f¡1(hsi)) is not WAMS. Thus even when we condition
a stationary measure on a ﬁltration consisting of ﬁnite ¾-algebras, the result is not necessarily a WAMS
measure when the state space is not countable.
Remark b: There is in fact no probability measure, ¹ with support on f(E) (= KºS1) that is WAMS but
not AMS. For if that were the case there would, for some non-cylinder set B 2 B(S1) \ f(E), be a set
A 2 B(S1) \ f(E) with ¹(A) ¸ 0 s.t. for hsi 2 A, 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 1B(T j(hsi) would not converge. But since there
is a one-to-one onto function H : [0;1] ! f(E), letting B1 = H¡1(B) we would have 1
J
PJ¡1




j=0 1B1£S1(T jhsi);8J, i.e. there would on A not be convergence for the cylinder B1£S1 either, implying
that ¹ is not WAMS.
Remark c: The chain fXtg is not positive recurrent: For any s 2 [0;1] let A = [0;1] n fs;h(s);h2(s);:::g
and ºS1(A i.o. js) = 0. Note that the chain is then not Harris (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 10 below).
Remark d: The chain is not indecomposable either: Let s 6= s0 be irrationals and let E = fs;h(s);h2(s);:::g
and E0 = fs0;h(s0);h2(s0);:::g. Then E \ E0 = ; and ¼(s;E) = 1;8s 2 E and ¼(s0;E0) = 1;8s0 2 E0
We next turn to study SSM processes when the state space is not countable. To follow are two preliminary
results.
19Proposition 8
(a) If °(¹;fΠtg) is WAMS and if ˜ ¹ ¿ ¹ then °(˜ ¹;fΠtg) is WAMS.
(b) If °(¹;Π) is WAMS it is AMS.














then °(¹;fΠtg)(AC) = 1 implying that °(˜ ¹;fΠtg)(AC) = 1.

















1)) for any A 2 B(S)



















°(±s0;Π)(B) is as a function of s0 measurable (Proposition V.2.1, Neveu, 1965) so the last expression makes
sense. This expression is in turn equal to
R






S ¯ °1(ds)°(±s;Π)(B). So ¯ °1 is an invariant measure for Π and a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for an initial distribution ¹ to exist s.t. Γ(¹;Π) is AMS is that Π has an invariant distribution
We are, however, interested in processes which are WAMS but not AMS. The reason is that asymptotic
mean stationarity is too strong a condition to model beliefs which are in the long run diverse. Recall that
if ¹ is AMS then (Gray,1987 corollary 6.3.2) ¯ ¹ asymptotically dominates ¹ in the sense that ¯ ¹(B) = 0 )
limj!1 ¹(T ¡jB) = 0. Thus eventually, any signiﬁcant statistical deviation from ¯ ¹ has probability zero.
Proposition 9






¡jCjG)hs;yi converges for all C 2 C(S
1 £ Y
1) (14)






¡jCjG)hs;yi ! ¯ º(C), for all C 2 C(S
1 £ Y
1)






¡jCjG)hs;yi ! ºhs;yi(C);8C 2 C(S
1 £ Y
1)
This follows from the Vitali-Hahn-Saks Theorem. Let ˜ C ½ B(S1 £ Y 1) be a countable generating set of





















it follows that º(B¤jG)(hs;yi) = 1 for hs;yi 2 ˜ C for some ˜ C s.t. º( ˜ C) = 1. Consider a hs0;y0i 2 ˜ A \ ˜ C. For




























- the convergence following from Lebesgue’s bounded convergence theorem. So for hs;yi 2 ˜ A\ ˜ C : ºhs;yi(C) =
º(C);8C 2 ˜ C, implying that ºhs;yi(B) = º(B);8B 2 B(S1 £ Y 1)
We use the concept of a Harris Chain to prove that there is a large class of Markov processes on a state
space S in <k which are stable but non-stationary. The following deﬁnition is taken from Durrett(1991):
Deﬁnition 10 Harris Chain.
A time homogenous Markov chain fZng taking values in S and with transition Π is a Harris chain if there
are sets A;B 2 B(S) and a function k : S £ S ! <, an ² > 0, and a probability measure ½ with ½(B) = 1
s.t. :
(i) k(s;s0) > ² for (s;s0) 2 A £ B
(ii) If we let ¿A = inffn ¸ 0 : Zn 2 Ag then P(¿A < 1jZ1 = s) > 0;8s 2 S




Suppose that ¯ Π on S is the transition probability of a Harris chain with ergodic and invariant distribution ¯ ¹.
Suppose furthermore that fΠ1;Π2;Π3;:::g is a countable set of transition probabilities on S and q1;q2;q3;:::
are non-negative numbers s.t.
(a)
P1
i=1 qiΠi = ¯ Π.
(b) 9c > 0, s.t. 8i 2 N;8s 2 S;8F 2 B(S) : c¯ Π(s;F) · Πi(s;F).
Then if we let q be a probability measure on N with q(fig) = qi and let Q = ­1
t=1q we have for Q a.a. hii




is a stable probability measure on ((S £N)1;B((S £N)1)) and that °(˜ ¹;fΠitg1
t=1) is an SSM measure with
associated stationary measure °(¯ ¹; ¯ Π).
Proof: Everywhere below we use regular versions of conditional probabilities. We consider the time homoge-
nous stationary and ergodic Markov process fXt;Ytg1
t=1 on (S £N)1 with stationary distribution P deﬁned
by: (X1;Y1) has distribution ¯ ¹ ­ q and
P(Xt 2 F;Yt 2 GjXt¡1 = s;Yt¡1 = i;Xt¡2 = st¡2;Yt¡2 = it¡2;:::;X1 = s1;Y1 = i1g = q(G)Πi(s;F) (15)
with unique extension to all of B(S £N) (To see that this process is indeed ergodic notice that if we let N ¤
be the support of q,
R
E£N¤ ¯ ¹ ­ q(d(s;i))¢q(N ¤)Πi(s;E) =
R
E ¯ ¹(ds)¯ Π(s;E) < 1 unless ¯ ¹(E) = 1).
Let PS1 be the marginal of P on S1. Then for any F 2 B(S):
PS1(Xt 2 FjXt¡1 = st¡1;Xt¡2 = st¡2;:::;X1 = s1) = ¯ Π(st¡1;F) (16)
Note, that if fYtg were a Markov chain say, this would not be correct. For a proof of ( 16 ) see Appendix A.
Let G = fS1;;g £ B(N 1). We want to show the following:








To this end we deﬁne a transformed (canonical) Markov process f ˆ Xt; ˆ Ytg on an enlarged state space, ((ˆ S £
N)1;B(ˆ S)1£B(N 1)). Here ˆ S ´ S[f®g, ® being an extra member added to S, and B(ˆ S) = B(S)[fB[f®g :
B 2 B(S)g. Let ˆ ¹ be an initial distribution on B(ˆ S) with ˆ ¹(f®g) = ˆ ²¯ ¹(A) and ˆ ¹(F) = ¯ ¹(F) ¡ ½(F)ˆ ²¯ ¹(A)
for F 2 B(S) (that ˆ ¹ is in fact a probability measure is shown in Appendix A). The stationary distribution
of f ˆ Xt; ˆ Ytg is denoted ˆ P.
We replace k with ˆ k = ck and ² with ˆ ² = c² and deﬁne in line with Durrett, the transformed transition
probabilities ˆ Πi;i = 1;2;::: on ˆ S £ B(ˆ S).
(a) If s 2 S n A : ˆ Πi(s;C) = Πi(s;C), for C 2 B(S).
22(b) If s 2 A : ˆ Πi(s;f®g) = ˆ ² and ˆ Πi(s;C) = Πi(s;C) ¡ ˆ ²½(C);C 2 B(S).
(c) ˆ Πi(®;D) =
R ˆ Πi(s;D)½(ds);D 2 B(ˆ S).
Then ˆ P(( ˆ X1; ˆ Y1) 2 G) = ˆ ¹ ­ q(G) and ˆ Πi(s;F)q(G) =
ˆ P(( ˆ Xt; ˆ Yt) 2 F £ Gj( ˆ Xt¡1; ˆ Yt¡1) = (s;i);( ˆ Xt¡2; ˆ Yt¡2) = (st¡2;it¡2);:::;( ˆ X1; ˆ Y1) = (s1;i1))
If we let ¯ ˆ Π =
P1
i=1 qiˆ Πi, ˆ ¹ = ˆ ¹¯ ˆ Π (see Appendix A) so, since
R
(ˆ ¹­q)(d(s;i))ˆ Πi(s;F)q(G) = q(G)
R
ˆ ¹(ds)¯ ˆ Π(s;F)
the process is stationary and in fact also ergodic (also shown in Appendix A). Note that this implies that ®
is positive recurrent under ˆ P, since ˆ ¹(f®g) > 0.
We next deﬁne the function g : ˆ S £ N ! f0;1g £ N by g(s;i) = (1®(s);i) and let G : (ˆ S £ N)1 !
(f0;1g£N)1 denote
Q1













jhz;ii) ! ˆ P ± G





Because of the stationarity of ˆ P ± G¡1 we have that ˆ P ± G¡1(E¤) = 1 (a consequence of Proposition 1). Let
E = G¡1(E¤) and D = G¡1(B(f0;1g £ N)1) . We now want to construct a useful representation of ˆ P(¢jD).
Let F £ (ˆ S £ N)1 2 Ck((ˆ S £ N)1) be given. For any L ¸ k + 1, let
AL = f[(z1;y1);:::;(zL;yL)] 2 (f0;®g £ N)
L : z1 = ®;zL¡k+1 = ®;zl 6= ®;1 < l < L ¡ k + 1g
For any [(z1;y1);:::;(zL;yL)] 2 [L¸k+1AL and any 0 · j · L ¡ k ¡ 1, let K([(z1;y1);:::;(zL;yL)];j) =
ˆ P (hs;ii : zl = ® , sl = ®;il = yl;1 · l · L;[(sj+1;ij+1);:::;(sj+1+k;ij+1+k)] 2 F)
ˆ P (hs;ii : zl = ® , sl = ®;il = yl;1 · l · L;)
whenever the denominator is positive, 0 else. Consider a given hs0;i0i 2 (ˆ S £ N)1 and j ¸ 0. If there are
t · j + 1 s.t. s0
t = ® and t ¸ j + 2 s.t. st = ® and s.t. s0









ˆ P (hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t = ®;it = i0
t;t · ¯ t + k ¡ 1;[(sj+1;ij+1);:::;(sj+1+k;ij+1+k)] 2 F)
ˆ P (hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t = ®;it = i0
t;t · ¯ t + k ¡ 1)
=
ˆ P (hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t = ®;it = i0
t;t · t · ¯ t + k ¡ 1;[(sj+1;ij+1);:::;(sj+1+k;ij+1+k)] 2 F)
ˆ P (hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t = ®;it = i0




hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t+t¡1 = ®;it = i0




hs;ii : st = ® , s0
t+t¡1 = ®;it = i0
t+t¡1;1 · t · ¯ t ¡ t + k
´ (18)
23where the second equality follows since the process is Markovian and the third is a consequence of stationarity.




t+k¡1)];j ¡ t + 1). If we for any L ¸ k + 1 and






























































where M(Ths;ii;(z;i)L) = 1, if [(s1;i1);:::;(sL;iL)] = (z;i)L, = 0 else. For all hs0;i0i 2 E, the ﬁrst part of
this sum converges as J ! 1 while the second and third parts tend to 0.




j=0 ˆ P(T ¡jCjD)hs0;i0i converges for all k-dimensional cylinders in C(ˆ S1 £N 1). Letting G® = fˆ S1;;g£




































j=0 ˆ P(T ¡jCjD)hs;ii
¯ ¯


















¡jCjD)hs;ii) ˆ P(dhˆ s;iijG®)hs
0;i
0i
In the ﬁnal step of the proof we show ( 17 ) using the convergence result just established. Let v0 be a transition
probability on ˆ S with v(s;fsg) = 1;s 2 S and v(®;C) = ½(C) for C 2 B(ˆ S) then ¹ = ˆ ¹v. (see Appendix
A). We also have for all i that vˆ Πi = ˆ Πi and ˆ Πiv = Πi. The proof is a repetition of that of Lemma 6.1 from
Chapter 5 of Durrett(1991), see Appendix A for details. Consider hˆ s0;i0i 2 E. Let ¹j, respectively ˆ ¹j be the
marginals on the j’th coordinate of S1, respectively ˆ S1 of P(¢jG)hs;i0i and ˆ P(¢jG®)hˆ s;i0i respectively. We





























































Then let the transition probability º on ˆ S £ N be deﬁned by º((s;i);A £ fjg) = º0(s;A)±fig(fjg);8A 2
B(ˆ S).
Let C = F £ (S £ N)1 2 Ck((S £ N)1). We study 1
J
PJ¡1































































which is a bounded and measurable function, ( 19 ) can be rewritten as
Z
ˆ S


















E ˆ P(H( ˆ Xj+1; ˆ Yj+1;:::; ˆ Yj+k)jG®)hˆ s;i
0i (20)
which converges because of the convergence of 1
J
PJ¡1
j=0 ˆ P(T ¡jCjG®)hs0;i0i for all cylinders.
We have shown, for all k, all C 2 CK(S1) and for all hs;ii 2 E that ( 17 ) holds. From Proposition 9 it
follows, that the convergence is in fact to P(C) for Q a.a. hii.
The marginal of P(¢jG)hs;i0i is °(¯ ¹;fΠi0
tg) as follows from ( 15 ), thus P(¢jG)hs;i0i =°(¯ ¹;fΠi0
tg)­±hi0i. From
( 16 ) it follows that ¯ °(¯ ¹;fΠi0
tg) = °(¯ ¹; ¯ Π). By Proposition 8, these features are not changed if we replace ¯ ¹
with ˜ ¹
Remark 7
It should be noted that we could weaken somewhat the requirement that c¯ Π(s;F) · Πi(s;F);8F 2 S, since
it need only hold for s 2 A and F ½ B
254 Sun-spot rational belief structures, anonymity and structural
independence
4.1 Sunspot rational belief structures
The purpose of this section is to motivate and deﬁne the concept of a Sunspot Rational Belief Structure
(SRBS). A SRBS deﬁnes a stochastic process of exogenous variables fXtg and a stochastic process of sunspots
fDTg. The latter are sunspots in the sense that their empirical distribution is independent of the empirical
distribution of the exogenous variables. However, according to the subjective rational beliefs held by agents
and described in the SRBS, there need not be independence8.
In the ﬁrst example discussed here we stay in the framework of a rational belief structure as deﬁned in
Nielsen(1996). There (and in other papers using the concept of a rational belief structure) it was assumed
that there are M agents, where agent m has a sequence fBmtg1
t=1 of either one-period beliefs for the SIDS
case or transition probabilities (i.e. one-period conditional beliefs) for the SSM case and furthermore, that
there is an exogenous stochastic process fXtg1
t=1. In many cases (f.i. the one commodity stochastic OLG
model), the equilibrium price function then has the form pt = P(Xt;B1t;:::;BMtg. In the next example we
assume that M is equal to 2 and that each agent only has 2 possible one-period (conditional) beliefs and
furthermore, that Xt only takes two values. This means that there will at most be 8 observed equilibrium
prices for the economy. One problem we encounter with this framework is that there is an obvious correlation
between the beliefs of the individual agent and the prices. In previous work (i.e. Kurz and Schneider, 1996,
Kurz and Wu, 1996, and Nielsen, 1996) it was assumed that agents do not explore this connection and,
comparing it to the assumption of competitive behavior in GE models, it was stated that one should expect
this phenomena to disappear when the number of agents becomes larger. More speciﬁcally it was assumed
that no agent consider his own belief part of the data when deriving the stationary measure. If he did so, he
would discover the connection between his beliefs and prices, and knowing his own future beliefs he would be
able to predict more accurately future prices. As we shall see below, in rational beliefs equilibria where beliefs
(on fundamentals) are described by an SRBS, no agent can discover any correlation between his own beliefs
and endogenous variables even at inﬁnity. None the less, sunspots act as sources of correlated ﬂuctuations in
beliefs that in turn create ﬂuctuations in aggregate variables like prices. This is much the same eﬀect as was
obtained when rational belief structures were used (i.e. without anonymity). Thus we may conclude that the
results obtained hitherto (without anonymity) can be interpreted in terms of models with many anonymous
8In this sense, sunspots are not extrinsic, however we use the term ’sunspots’ because of their stated independence from
exogenous fundamentals and because they function as coordination devices for the beliefs of individual agents. In the original
article on sunspots, Cass and Shell(1983), the possibility that agents may have subjective expectations about sunspots was
considered (see p. 208).
26agents as it was (implicitly) claimed and that in this sense, the issue of anonymity is mostly of a technical
nature. However, as the following example demonstrates, in the case where agents have Markovian beliefs, so
that they condition their forecasts on present observations there is potentially a separate issue, since realized
expectations may then be quite arbitrary.
Example 4
Suppose ﬁrst that there is an exogenous process which has 8 diﬀerent states and that the stationary measure
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i.e. the stationary distribution is i.i.d. with every state having the same probability. Now suppose the belief
of some agent is SSM with two transition matrices each occurring with frequency 1
2. The two transition













































































































































If an agent has a Markovian beliefs, at each date, he conditions his forecast on the realized observed variables
at that date. Thus, his realized belief depends both on his subjective belief and on the true (unknown)
distribution (both probability measures on S1). If there is no particulary bad9 correlation between the
realization of the variable and the sequence of generating variables, then the forecasts conditional on the
observed variable will on average be correct. This means that if for instance one looks at those dates where
state number 1 is observed, then the average forecast on those dates will be equal to the average empirical
distribution on dates following state number 1.
Next consider a diﬀerent interpretation of these beliefs. Suppose that the 8 diﬀerent states describe
fundamentals in terms of a two agent situation (where each agent has two possible transition matrices) and two
9Speciﬁcally, if we have structural independence as deﬁned below (see also Example 6).
27exogenous states i.e. the fundamental states are s1 = (B1;B1;X1), s2 = (B1;B1;X2), s3 = (B1;B2;X1),....,
s7 = (B2;B2;X1), s8 = (B2;B2;X2). Each agent m uses each transition matrix Bj;j = 1;2 half of the
dates. This would imply that the second half of B1 and the ﬁrst half of B2 would never be used by agent
1: Whenever he uses matrix B1, one of the ﬁrst four states (which are the states where he uses B1 ) is the
present realized state, and he will be conditioning on one of these four states (thus not using the second half
of B1). Whenever he uses matrix B2, one of the last four states is the present realized state, which he is then
conditioning on, and consequently he is not using the ﬁrst half of B2).
So although according to his rational belief as well as the (empirical) stationary measure, the state X2
happens half of the dates, and although this is conﬁrmed by his observations, his conditional belief for the
next period will always be that state has 0 probability. Note, that at any date, his belief predicts that the
frequency of X2 will be 1
2 in the future (but that X2 will not happen the next date)
That such a case can arise in the context of rational beliefs may or may not be considered a problem. The
crux of the theory is after all that agents are mistaken, and it is not ruled out that it can be discovered that
their beliefs have hitherto performed badly. One should also note that the above phenomenon only arises
because agents implicitly condition on their own beliefs. If they for instance only conditioned on exogenous
variables we would be back in the framework of the ﬁrst interpretation of the above set-up and there would
be no problem. The next example is used to explain the idea behind SRBS and to see how we get anonymity
and avoid the problem from Example 4 (see also Kurz, 1998 for another approach to dealing with these
issues).
Example 5
Deﬁne the sunspot state to be either D1 or D2 and let the exogenous state be X1 or X2 as before. There
are 8 agents in the economy (we will later assume that there is a continuum) and they are all identical
in terms of endowments and preferences and diﬀer only in terms of the timing but not frequency of their
(conditional) beliefs. At any date (no matter the state), 3=4 £ 1=2 = 3=8 of the agents have belief B1,
3=4 £ 1=2 = 3=8 of them have belief B2, 1=4 £ 1=2 = 1=8 of them have belief B3 and 1=4 £ 1=2 = 1=8 of
them have B4. Which of the agents have the diﬀerent beliefs diﬀers. The state space of fundamentals is :

















































































































































































































































period’s state and 1=4 of them have (0; 1
2;0; 1









12) over the next period’s state. When the state is (D1;X2),




3) over next period’s state and 1=4 of them have
(1
2;0; 1









8) over the next period’s state. We should check whether there will be endogenous uncertainty, that
is whether the prices in, say the states (D1;X1) and (D2;X1) are diﬀerent. Note that in state (D1;X1), 3=4
of the agents put probability 2=3 on X1 and 1=4 of them put probability 0 on X1. On the other hand, in
state (D2;X1), 1=2 of the agents put probability 2=12 on X1 and 1=2 of them put probability 10=12 on X1.
This means that agents believe that the current value of the sunspot aﬀects the probability of the exogenous
variables next period. Since all the agents are the same, in a model with risk aversion (where beliefs matter),
agents will behave diﬀerently in the two states if the prices in those states are the same, so the prices cannot
be the same. A similar argument shows that the two states (D1;X2) and (D2;X2) must be diﬀerent in terms
of prices. Thus the four states are diﬀerent in terms of observed variables: prices and X. In this sense we
have excess volatility, that is the price volatility is not only determined by exogenous shocks but also by
changes in agents’ beliefs.
In the example just presented, the agents who are all identical ( except for the timing of the sequence of
conditional beliefs) have no way to discern a statistical connection between the states they observe and their
individual beliefs. This is so, because when the individual agent uses the matrix Bn, at 1=4 of the times the
state is (D1;X1), at 1=4 of the times it is (D1;X2) and so on. Thus the individual agent who has an SSM
belief with four one-period conditional beliefs , B1, B2, B3, and B4 has no way to convert his knowledge
about his own (or his dynasty’s) future belief into a knowledge about future prices. For this idea to work it
is important that the endogenous variables that may arise, do only depend on D and X and not on who has
which beliefs in any endogenous state. That is why it was assumed that the eight agents were identical, i.e.
were of the same type. Note, however that we can expand on this example and allow for many diﬀerent types
of agents as long as there are many of each type. We then require that at any date, the number of agents of
a certain type that uses a certain (conditional) belief is the same. We now turn to the formal deﬁnition of a
sunspot RBS.
29Deﬁnition 11 Sunspot Rational Belief Structure (SRBS).
The Borel measurable set of sunspot states is D ½ <KD. The Borel measurable set of exogenous states is





represents the stationary measure for the exogenous variables where ¯ ΠX is




represents the stationary measure for the sunspot variables where ¯ ΠD is a transition probability
on D and ¹D is an invariant ergodic probability measure for ¯ ΠD having D as support. Let Π = ΠX £ ΠD
and ¹ = ¹X ­ ¹D. Here the transition probability ΠX £ ΠD is deﬁned by ΠX £ ΠD((x;d);AX £ AD) =
ΠX(x;AX)ΠD(d;AD) for AX 2 B(X) and AD 2 B(D). The stationary measure on (S1;B(S1)) then is
°(¹;Π).
True Distribution: B0 = ° (¹0;fΠ0tg1
t=1) is the distribution of an SSM process on S with associated stationary





Types of agents: There are K · 1 types of agents in the economy. For each type k there is a continuum of
agents represented by the interval (0;1]. Type k is having an SSM belief using the set fΠklg
1
l=1 of transition
probabilities on S, each having frequency qkl ¸ 0 s.t.
P1
l=1 qklΠkl = ¯ Π. We let Qk = ­1
t=1qk where qk is the
probability measure on N with qk(flg) = qkl.
Beliefs of type k agents: Consider an agent m 2 (0;1] of type k. We represent his belief Bkm by a sequence
of transition probabilities as follows:
Divide the interval [0;1] into the countable set of intervals, Ikj, j = 1;2:: where Ikj =
³Pj










l=1 qkj ¡ qkj
qkj
if x 2 Ikl
Then deﬁne the function dk;1 : (0;1] ! N by dk;1(m) = j if m 2 Ikj and deﬁne for t > 1 dk;t : (0;1] ! N by
dk;t(m) = dk;1(T
t¡1













It should be noted that the SRBS is constructed so as to let prices aﬀect beliefs. If in equilibrium each
fundamental state is associated with a diﬀerent price, we can assume that agents observe and condition on
prices and exogenous variables rather than on the variables in D. In this particular respect the construction
is similar to that of Kurz and Schneider(1996), who also allow for an inﬂuence of prices on beliefs. Another
interpretation of a SRBS would suggest that diﬀerent types of agents may not observe and condition their
beliefs on the same sunspot. However, since the sunspot that a particular type observes will typically inﬂuence
prices, other agents will indirectly, by conditioning on prices, condition their beliefs on that sunspot. In this
30sense beliefs about sunspots are contagious. Finally it should be noted that if all agents use the empirical
distribution as their belief, this is equivalent to them adopting stationary rational expectations.
4.2 Structural Independence
The concept of structural independence was introduced in Nielsen(1994) as a condition that guarantees that
systems of stable beliefs are jointly stable and also as a natural notion of incorrectness of rational beliefs.
In the context of SSM beliefs, structural independence between a belief and the true process turns out also
to guarantee that the realized sequence of conditional beliefs (as a function of a realized sequence of states)
of an individual agent is rational. Without any assumptions about the relationship between beliefs and the
true distribution this is not necessarily the case (see Example 6 below). Consider a particular agent, m and
his rational SSM belief °(¹m;fΠmtg) on the sequence space S1. The realized sequence, hsti is governed
by the probability measure °(¹0;fΠ0tg). At any date, t, the realized belief of the agent, after st has been
observed, is °(±st;fΠmsg1
s=t). Let fFtg1
t=0 be the natural ﬁltration (induced by information at date t). It is














t=1) a.a. hsi (21)
However, we are interested in whether there is convergence for °(¹;fΠ0tg) a.a. hsi:
Deﬁnition 12 Conditional WAMS and Conditional Rationality.
Let ¹ be a probability measure on (S1;B(S1)) and let º be a stable probability measure on the same space.








¡jCjFj)hsi converges for º-a.a.hsi (22)
If the convergence in ( 22 ) is to ¯ º(¢jI)hsi, we say that ¹ is conditionally rational relative to º
Example 6 Absence of conditional rationality.
Let S = f0;1g and the belief an SSM measure involving two matrices, Π0 and Π1 each with frequency 1
2 (i.e.








The empirical distribution is i.i.d. with probability of 0 being 1
2. Let fΠtg be a Q-typical realization deﬁning,
together with the belief that X1 = 0 with probability 1, a WAMS rational belief. Now construct a sequence
fstg as follows:
31If Πt = Π
0;st = 0
else st = 1
Then Πt(st;f0g) = 1;8t so the belief is not conditionally rational relative to ±hsi. Moreover, the associated
stationary measure of ±hsi is equal to the empirical distribution.
Note that we do not have structural independence between the belief and the true measure (which is an SSM
measure). Also, by modifying the true sequence in a suitable way, we get a belief which is not conditionally
WAMS
If the belief of an agent is not conditionally WAMS relative to the true measure, then we could have that
his realized actions, as they depend on his realized beliefs, are non-stable. However, conditional WAMS is
not suﬃcient to ensures stability of the resulting action as the following example demonstrates.
Example 7 Belief is stable but resulting action is not.
Suppose an agent is betting on a fair coin with outcome, xt at date t, in f0;1g. Let the belief of the agent





1T¤(t) does not converge as J ! 1
The belief is: ¹(xt = 1) = 1=2 + 1=t if t 2 T ¤, 1=2 ¡ 1=t, else. If the agent wins he receives $1 else he pays
$1 and if he is risk neutral, he will bet on 1 at all dates in T ¤, and on 0 at all other dates. The belief is
WAMS, while the actions are not stable. Neither conditional WAMS nor WAMS is suﬃcient for stability of
an equilibrium process
The stability of the actions of an individual agent may also become an issue if he is inﬁnitely lived, even when
his belief is WAMS. Suppose his SIDS belief, ­1
t=1Πt in non-stationary. Then we have for t 6= t0, that ­1
s=tΠs
6= ­1
s=t0Πt (Remark 2). So the countable sequence of beliefs about the inﬁnite future never repeats itself and
in that particular sense this sequence is ”non-stable”. If the actions of this agent are sensitive to beliefs into
the distant future, possibly his actions may then become be non-stable. If the agent discounts future utility,
this may however not be the case. The question about induced stability of actions is important, but we will
not consider it further here since, as is implied by Proposition 11 to follow, for the systems of beliefs we
study, stability of actions is always the case for short-lived agents. The following deﬁnition is an extension
from Nielsen(1994).
Deﬁnition 13 Structural Independence.




t=1) (generated by Qi = ­1
t=1qi;i = 1;2 respectively) are
said to be structurally independent if the sequence fΠ1
t;Π2
tg1
t=1 is Q1 ­ Q2-typical
32Proposition 11
Let q be a probability measure on P = fΠ1;Π2;:::g, a countable set of transition probabilities on S and let








(a) For the case where S is countable,
(b) For the general case, if the conditions of Proposition 10 hold,
that for Q ­ QB a.a. hΠ;ΠBi 2 P1 £ P1
B , °(¯ ¹;fΠB
t g1
t=1) is an SSM measure which is conditionally rational
relative to the SSM measure °(¯ ¹;fΠtg1
t=1).
Proof: (a) Construct the probability measure º on S£P£PB as follows: The initial distribution is ¯ ¹­q­qB
and the transition probability M is deﬁned by:
M((s;Π;Π
B);f˜ sg £ f˜ Πg £ f˜ Π
Bg) = Π(s;f˜ sg)q(f˜ Πg)qB(f˜ Π
Bg)
º is ergodic and stationary. Let G = ¾[fS1;;g £ B(P1) £ B(P1
B )]. From Proposition 7 we have (using
the notation of that proposition) that for Q ­ QB a.a. h˜ Π; ˜ ΠBi and any ˜ s that º(¢jG)h˜ s; ˜ Π; ˜ ΠBi is WAMS
with associated stationary measure being º. Thus if F : (S £ P £ PB)L ! < is integrable we have for









j+L)) ! EºF as J ! 1





































j+L) = °(¯ ¹;fΠB










Π(sL;dsL+1)1CL+1(s1;¢¢¢sL+1) = °(¯ ¹;Π)(C)
(b) The argument is basically the same as in (a). Let h : P£PB ! N be one-to-one and onto and deﬁne g1 and
g2 on N by h¡1(n) = (g1(n);g2(n)). Let ˜ Q on N be deﬁned by ˜ Qfng = Q­QB(f(g1(n);g2(n))g) and let ˜ P =
f˜ Π1; ˜ Π2;:::g be deﬁned by ˜ Πj = g1(j). Then by Proposition 10 we have for ˜ Q a.a. h¯ ni that °(¯ ¹;f˜ Π¯ ntg1
t=1)­±h¯ ni
is WAMS on ((S £ N)1;B((S £ N)1)). In other words, we have that °(¯ ¹;f˜ Π¯ ntg1
t=1) ­ ±fg1(¯ nt)g ­ ±fg2(¯ nt)g
is WAMS on ((S £ P £ PB)1;B((S £ P £ PB)1)). As before, using the deﬁnition in ( 23 ), we have for
°(¯ ¹;f˜ Π¯ ntg1
t=1) a.a. hsi that 1
J
PJ
j=1 F(sj;g2(¯ nj);:::;g2(¯ nj+L)) ! °(¯ ¹; ¯ Π)(C) (by the rationality of beliefs)
33Remark 8
The proposition can be interpreted as stating that for ”almost all” true distributions and rational beliefs
which are structurally independent, we have conditional rationality of the belief. On the other hand, if an
agent happens to have a correct belief, we do have conditional rationality but not structural independence
Remark 9
Note that when we have an SRBS (if relevant, fulﬁlling the conditions of Proposition 10), it is the case that
(Lebesgue) almost all agents have rational beliefs which are conditionally rational and which induce actions
that are stable when agents are short lived (or myopic), i.e. their actions only depend on their forecasts for
a limited number of future periods
5 An application
To illustrate how the concept of a Sunspot Rational Belief Structure may be applied, we present a general
equilibrium, continuous state space version of the model of Muth(1961). In the context of rational beliefs,
partial equilibrium versions of this model were studied in Kurz(1994) (where the existence of an equilibrium
with homogenous beliefs was proved) and in Nielsen(1996) (where an example with diverse beliefs and a
ﬁnite state space was provided). In these kind of models, whether rational expectations or rational beliefs
are imposed, producers decide on their output before they know prices. In our version of the model, there is
a continuum of agents that interpret sunspots diﬀerently over time in such a way that these interpretations
are consistent with the observed average independence between sunspots and fundamentals of the economy.
Despite this empirical independence, the sunspots do inﬂuence real economic activity, since they inﬂuence
beliefs and hence production decisions (and in the following period prices of all commodities)10. This would
be so, whether agents observe the current production decisions (i.e. the current beliefs) of other agents or
not. However, we assume that they do not, i.e. contrary to the rational expectations case we do not assume
common knowledge of beliefs. The consequence is a miscoordination similar to what was found in the original
cobweb model, but now founded on a rigorous theory about expectations. The model we present does not
strive for maximal generality, but is constructed to exemplify how the theoretical concepts and results, we
presented may apply to general equilibrium models.
There are N commodities and K types of agents, both ﬁnite numbers. Each type of agent, k = 1;2;:::;K
at any date uses one of Lk possible short term beliefs (that is transition probabilities). We assume that X
is an interval in < and that D is ﬁnite. Time is discrete and runs from 1 to 1. In odd periods (denoted
10As a consequence, even if the exogenous process is stationary, the equilibrium process need not be.
34No) agents make production decisions based on their expectations about prices and exogenous shocks the
following period. In even periods, production is realized, commodities are exchanged at market clearing prices
and consumption takes place. In odd period t an agent of type k receives the signal dk
t 2 Dk and observes the
exogenous shock xt, but he does not observe the signal of other agents (there is asymmetric information). As
a consequence an individual tries to make forecasts not only about future exogenous shocks but also about
how much other agents are currently deciding to produce (that is about the current beliefs of other types as
parametrized by d). Let D = £K
k=1Dk and dt = (d1
t;:::;dK
t ). Mainly in order to facilitate the presentation
of the model we assume that the beliefs have the following format:
Πkl((x;d
k);Ax £ Ad) = ¼kl((x;d
K);Ax)¹D(Ad);8k;l;(x;d) 2 X £ D;Ax 2 B(X);Ad ½ D (24)
where ¼kl maps X £Dk into the set of probability measures on (X;B(X)). We also assume that ¹X on X is
equivalent to Lebesgues measure and that
¼kl((x;d
k);¢) ¼ ¹X ¼ ΠX(x;¢);8k;l;(x;d) (25)
At any t 2 N0, an agent of belief-type (k;l) decides on input of labor, ® 2 [0;Ak] in producing Fk(®) of
commodity n(k) 2 f1;2;:::;Ng. Fk is C2, increasing and concave, Fk(0) = 0. We assume that, 8n 2
f1;2;:::;Ng;9k 2 f1;2;:::;Kg s.t. n(k) = n.
Each agent consumes leisure and the N consumption goods. The consumption set (for any state (d;x;x))
of an agent of type k is <N
++ £ [0;Ak]. The preferences over consumption depend on the exogenous shocks.
Thus, we deﬁne a utility function uk : <N
++ £ [0;Ak] £ X2 ! < for each even period. Given stochastic
consumption of consumption goods and leisure, C : D £ X2 ! <N
++, l : X £ D ! [0;Ak] and given a belief






where ½ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor. We assume that uk is smooth and that for all (x;x0) 2 X2: uk(¢;¢;x;x0)
is strictly increasing, strictly concave, with indiﬀerence curves that are uniformly bounded away from @<N+1
+ .




its interior. In equilibrium there will be a measurable price




( we normalize prices state by state). At odd date t, an agent of belief-type
(k;l) with d
k, x and p given is faced with the following problem:













Cn(d;x)pn(d;x;x) = pn(k)(d;x;x)Fk(®) for ¹D(¢jd
k) ­ ¼kl((x;d
k);¢) a.a. (d;x) (27)



















k ¡ ®;x;x) ¡ ¸(d;x)pn(d;x;x) = 0;1 · n · N; for ¹D(¢jd
k) ­ ¼kl((x;d
k);¢) a.a. (d;x) (29)



















k);dx) = 0 (30)
We are now ready to present the deﬁnition of equilibrium:
Deﬁnition 14 Equilibrium
A price function p, labor supply: ®kl : D£X ! [0;Ak];8k;l, measurable, and consumption, Ckl : D£X2 !
<N
++;8k;l, measurable s.t. 8d 2 D and ¹X a.a. x:
(a) Ckl(¢;¢;x) : D £ X ! <N










l=1 Ckln(d;x;x)qkl for n = 1;2;:::;n, for ¹X a.a. x
Recall that qkl is the weight of the continuum of agents of belief-type (k;l). A particular agent i is of a
certain type k, but which belief (in terms of ¼kl) he uses varies over time. However, any agent of belief-type
(k;l) acts the same way in this model no matter the date or the past. Consequently, we need only consider
actions of the diﬀerent belief-types and not of the individual agents.
Sketch of proof of existence of equilibrium
We sketch the proof here, further details are provided in Appendix B. The equilibrium is found as a ﬁxed point
of a correspondence from the set of production decisions into that same set. This correspondence is deﬁned for
a given x. For every array of production decisions, f®klg À 0 there is a set of measurable price functions p s.t.




is an equilibrium for the even date sub-economy with belief-type (k;l) having
utility function uk(¢;®kl;x;x) and initial endowment of commodity n(k) in the amount of ®kl. On the other




there is an optimal supply for an agent of belief-type (k;l),
®kl : D ! <. Composing the correspondence from production decisions into (measurable) price functions
with the function from price functions into production decisions, we obtain the desired correspondence
Using the results obtained previously, let us summarize the features that this model exhibits. Each agent
holds a rational belief about the stochastic process of equilibrium prices (remember, that presenting the
sunspot RBS in terms of beliefs on primitives is only a modelling device and that in equilibrium the beliefs of
each agent can be transformed into beliefs about prices, using the functional relationship between (d;x) and
p) - rational in the sense that each belief would, if it were correct, generate the same empirical distribution
of exogenous variables and prices as does the true (unknown) distribution. These beliefs are in terms of
36(Markovian) WAMS probability measures on a continuous state space and moreover, they are for almost all
agents conditionally rational, that is the sequence of realized conditional beliefs also conforms to the empirical
(stationary) measure.
Recalling that the basic motivation of rational beliefs is to describe an environment where something but
not everything is learnable, the model thus demonstrates how mistakes and increased price volatility arise in
such environments. The fact that not everything is learnable means that there are many possible models that
ﬁts the observed behavior of the economy. We argued that using the stationary measure is a conservative
strategy and that the use of any other rational belief is a sign of overconﬁdence on the part of the agent.
Overconﬁdent agents continue to believe that they can forecast the future prices better than they actually
did (when they look back at their performance). This overconﬁdence is however rational precisely in the
sense that the belief employed is consistent with observations.
An important assumption made was that agents have asymmetric information about the sunspot. In
other words, agents of one type are at odd dates uncertain about what beliefs agents of other types hold11.
This is one way of modelling what we consider to be a fact, namely that market participants (whether they
be producers or ﬁnancial ﬁrms) only get to know the beliefs and hence actions of other participants with
a delay12. This together with the assumption of some sort of adaptive expectations were the fundamental
assumptions underlying the cobweb model. Muth’s contribution sought to confront the assumption made
about expectations, not the assumption made about the timing of information. In the context of the cobweb
model, the aim of the rational beliefs literature is precisely to provide a more solid foundation, in terms
of the modelling of expectations, for the miscoordination of market actions that the original cobweb model
sought to illustrate. In particular, in contrast with the original model, there is in the rational beliefs version
no singular easily recognizable sequence of price movements that, one could argue, all rational agents ought
to identify and adopt as their own belief. By introducing sunspots as quasi-public coordination devices, we
retain the assumption of anonymity, an important assumption in general equilibrium theory, but allow for
individual beliefs to have an impact on aggregate variables like prices. These sunspots, acting as coordinating
devices for beliefs, allow us to capture two important facts about the market participants: (i) that there are
correlated movements in their subjective expectations and (ii) that it is prohibitive costly if not outright
impossible to get to know these expectations for each and every one of them.
From the perspective of social welfare, we argue that there are two distinct (although both consequences
of the diversity of beliefs) sources of ineﬃciency in the equilibrium presented here. Firstly, and less contro-
11We assumed though, that they were using the empirical distribution ¹D in forming expectations about other’s beliefs - an
assumption that could be relaxed at the expense of a more complicated notation. In that case agents would have subjective
beliefs about the current distribution of other agents’ beliefs.
12The importance attributed to aggregate (and thus imprecise) market indicators, including various measurements of consumer
sentiments, by both the private and public sector, demonstrates that this information is not readily available.
37versially, the fact that agents do not observe each other’s subjective beliefs or actions at odd dates introduces
an added element of uncertainty which is social rather than exogenous. This social uncertainty has as conse-
quence that prices at even dates will exhibit excess volatility, that is there are more price states than would
be present if agents had rational expectations. Because this uncertainty is social it is also endogenous that
is, it is a product of the particular economic institution. To take an example, if a social planner dictated
the production level to each agent, said miscoordination and excess volatility would not be present (although
other types of miscoordination might then be present in stead).
Secondly, we argue that even if there were full information about the beliefs (or production decisions) of
all agents, there would still be an ineﬃciency due to the fact that individual agents use mutually inconsistent
beliefs in their optimization problem. There are at any date
P
k Lk diﬀerent short term beliefs, of which
at most one of them is correct. The inconsistency of these rational beliefs results in a social ineﬃciency13:
Most agents, if not all, make suboptimal decisions. Obviously, this position is at variance with the use of
Pareto ranking as a criterion for evaluating social incomes. Rather we propose to employ the so called ex
post optimality criterion, according to which a single belief should be used when evaluating the outcome
of an equilibrium for a particular economic institution. The concept of ex-post optimality is presented in
Hammond(1981) and employed in the context of rational beliefs in Nielsen(2003) where a fuller discussion of
the nature of this ineﬃciency, and how it can be remedied is provided.
6 Conclusion
With the new framework presented here we have considerably enlarged the scope for applying rational beliefs
to various general equilibrium frameworks. Speciﬁcally it is now possible to study dynamic models with an
Markovian empirical distribution on a continuous state space where agents are not only assumed to be, but
are in fact, anonymous. Such applications can be carried out along the lines developed in Nielsen(1996),
where the existence of a general equilibrium is established by showing the existence of a ﬁxed point for
a translation on a set of exogenous and endogenous variables. By imposing from the outset, that beliefs
are rational relative to the fundamentals of the economy, we ensure that in equilibrium, these beliefs are
rational relative to all variables. Compared to ﬁnding an equilibrium in a space of beliefs and distributions of
endogenous variables this considerably simpliﬁes the problem at hand. The growing literature on behavioral
economics demonstrates the need to go beyond the rational expectations assumption, which has been the
source of too many ”puzzles” - or, if one prefers, empirical refutations. However, the theoretical foundation of
behavioral economics still seems underdeveloped. We have argued that non-stationary rational beliefs exhibit
13This is the case whether markets are complete or not, however incompleteness of markets would probably accentuate the
problem.
38rational overconﬁdence and in this way the theory captures a recurring concept in behavioral economics. The
rationality requirement imposed, on beliefs then provides a clear delineation between which beliefs can be
considered acceptable to the theory and which cannot. Especially in ﬁnance there has been a very active
search for models that go beyond rational expectations and behavioral economics has has come to the fore
here. Since ﬁnance models often work with a continuous state space, we expect that SSM processes on a
continuous state space will be particularly useful in this context.
Appendix A
(1) Proof of ( 16 ):
We let xt = (xt;xt¡1;:::;x1) and for any measure ½ on a space of sequences, ½t, is the restriction to the ﬁrst



































(2) ˆ ¹ is a probability measure:




¯ Π(s;F)¯ ¹(ds) ¸
Z
A






0)¯ ¹(ds) = ¯ ¹(A)ˆ ²½(F) (31)




¯ ˆ Π(ˆ s;f®g)ˆ ¹(dˆ s) =
Z
A
ˆ ²ˆ ¹(dˆ s) + ¯ ˆ Π(®;f®g(ˆ ¹(f®g) = ˆ ²ˆ ¹(A) +
Z
S
¯ ˆ Π(s;f®g)½(ds)ˆ ¹(f®g)
= ˆ ²[¯ ¹(A) ¡ ½(A)ˆ ²¯ ¹(A)] + ½(A)ˆ ²
2¯ ¹(A) = ˆ ²¯ ¹(A) ´ ˆ ¹(f®g):
(ii) For F 2 B(S) :
Z
ˆ S
¯ ˆ Π(ˆ s;F)ˆ ¹(dˆ s) =
Z
S
¯ ˆ Π(ˆ s;F)ˆ ¹(dˆ s) + ¯ ˆ Π(®;F)ˆ ¹(f®g) =
Z
S




¯ ˆ Π(s;F)½(ds)ˆ ²¯ ¹(A) =
Z
S
¯ ˆ Π(s;F)d¯ ¹(s) =
Z
S
¯ Π(s;F)¯ ¹(ds) ¡ ˆ ²½(F)¯ ¹(A) = ¯ ¹(F) ¡ ˆ ²½(F)¯ ¹(A)
(4) Ergodicity of °(ˆ ¹; ¯ ˆ Π):
Note ﬁrst that the inequality in ( 31 ) is strict if ¯ ¹(F) > 0 or ½(A) > 0. So if ¯ ¹(F) > 0, ˆ ¹(F) > 0. And if
¯ ¹(F) = 0 then ˆ ¹(F) = 0. So if we let ˆ ¹S be ˆ ¹ restricted to S, ˆ ¹S ¼ ¯ ¹.
39We also have for all s 2 S that ¯ ˆ Π(s;A) = 0 , ¯ Π(s;A) = 0
Next note that if E is ¯ ˆ Π-invariant and ˆ ¹(E) > 0 then ® 2 E. Else, E would also be ¯ Π-invariant and we would
have ¯ ¹(E) = 1. But since ¯ ˆ Π(s;f®g) > 0, 8s 2 A and ˆ ¹(A) > 0 this would give a contradiction.
Thus if E is ¯ ˆ Π-invariant and 0 < ˆ ¹(e) < 1, there is measurable K ½ ˆ S nE s.t. ˆ ¹(K) > 0 and ¯ ˆ Π(s;K) = 0 for
ˆ ¹ a.a. s 2 E. But then 1 > ¯ ¹(K) > 0 and E n K is ¯ Π-invariant, contradicting the ergodicity of (¯ ¹; ¯ Π)






º(s;F)d[¹(s) ¡ ½(s)ˆ ²¹(A)] + ½(F)ˆ ¹(f®g) = ¹(F) ¡ ½(F)ˆ ²¹(A) + ½(F)ˆ ²¹(A) = ¹(F)
(6) ºˆ Πi = ˆ Πi:
ºˆ Πi(s;C) =
R
ˆ S º(s;ds0)ˆ Πi(s0;C) = ˆ Πi(s;C) for s 6= ®,
R
ˆ S ½(ds0)ˆ Πi(s0;C) = ˆ Πi(®;C), else
(7) ˆ Πiº = Πi:
Let s 2 S, C 2 B(S). ˆ Πiº(s;C) =
R
ˆ S ˆ Πi(s;ds0)º(s0;C). If s 2 S nA, this is equal to
R
S Πi(s;ds0)º(s0;C) =
Πi(s;C). If s 2 A, it is equal to
R





ˆ ²½(C) = Πi(s;C)
Appendix B
Proof of Equilibrium












D = £d2DAq. For the rest of the
proof we ﬁx an x 2 X. Deﬁne for f®klg 2 Aq and x 2 X the exchange economy ²(f®klg;x) by:
Belief-type (k;l) has preferences on <N
++ represented by the utility function uk(¢;®kl;x;x) : <N
++ ! < and
initial endowment ®kl of commodity n(k). We have at least one equilibrium price p 2
±
∆ for this economy 14.
Let
P = fp 2 (∆
N)
X : p is measurable B(X)g
and





In the following we use the topology of pointwise convergence on (∆N)X. Using lemma 1 on p. 55 of




D ) ˜ PD ´ £d2D ˜ P
deﬁned by
Ψ
q(®) = fp 2 ˜ PD : 8(x;d);p(d;x) is an equilibrium price for ²(f®kl(d)g;x)g
has non-empty values.
14This follows from the properties of the excess demand function, see f.i. Lemma 1 of Hildenbrand(1974), p.150.
40For every p 2 ˜ PD we have for each d 2 D and each (k;l) a solution ®kl(d) to the restricted problem of an
agent of belief-type (k;l), where we in his problem replace the condition ® 2 [0;Ak] with ® 2 A
q
k. By strict
concavity of u, this solution is unique. Thus we have deﬁned, for each q, a function
g
q : ˜ PD ! A
q
D
Lemma 8 Ψq is upper hemi continuous (u.h.c.).
Proof: Let ®r ! ® in A
q
D and pr ! p in ˜ PD s.t. pr 2 Ψq(®r);8r. So for given (d;x), pr(x;d) is an equilibrium
for the economy ²(f®r
kl(d)g;x);8r and (f®r
kl(d)g;x;pr(d;x)) ! (f®kl(d)g;x;p(d;x)). Because of continuity of
u, p(d;x) is then an equilibrium price for the economy ²(f®kl(d)g;x)
Lemma 9 gq is continuous.
Proof: Let pr ! p 2 ˜ PD pointwise. Consider a particular belief-type (k;l) and a state d 2 D. For each r
we then have a unique solution, (®r
kl(d);cr
kl) to the restricted problem of belief-type (k;l). f®r
kl(d)gr has a
convergent subsequence, w.l.o.g. itself, converging to some ®kl(d). If we consider ( 27 ) and ( 29 ) for given
d and x, it follows from the smoothness of u that there are c(d;x) and ¸(d;x) s.t. cr(d;x) ! c(d;x) and
¸r(d;x) ! ¸(d;x). It then follows from Lebesgue’s bounded convergence theorem that also ( 28 ) holds in
the limit, so that ®kl(d) is indeed (part of) the solution to the belief-type’s problem
It now follows from Hildenbrand(1974), Corollary to Proposition 1 (p. 22) that Φq±gq is u.h.c. Kakutani’s
ﬁxed point theorem gives us a sequence of ﬁxed points f®qg in £d2D £K
k=1 £
Lk
l=1[0;Ak] a compact set (as well
as a sequence, fcqg of optimal consumptions). Hence, there is a cluster point, ® for f®qg. To show that ® is
an equilibrium for the unrestricted economy, it is suﬃcient to show, for each (k;l) and d, that ®kl(d) > 0.












































k;x);dx) · 0 (32)
But if ®
q
kl(d) ! 0 then c
q
kln(k)(d;x) ! 0 for ¹D(¢jdk) ­ ¼kl((dk;x);¢) a.a. (d;x). Since we assumed that the
indiﬀerence curves are uniformly bounded away from the boundary of <N+1














and since F 0
k(®q) is bounded away from 0 this is incompatible with ( 32 )
41Ψq has non-empty values
Let Ekl be the excess demand of belief-type (k;l) as a function of p and x (and with ®kl > 0). Ekl is
continuous:




and where Er = Ekl(pr;xr);8r. Then the ﬁrst order conditions hold
for all r and, since u is smooth, they also hold in the limit.




assign, to each x 2 X, the set of equilibrium prices for the economy ²(f®klg;x). Then
Φf®klg is closed valued since if pr ! p, pr 2 Φf®klg(x);8r then, letting E =
P
kl Ekl, E(pr) = 0;8r and so, also
E(p) = 0.
Let F ½ ∆N be closed. We show that B = fx : Φf®klg(x) \ F 6= ;g is also closed. So let fxrg be a sequence
in B converging to x and let pr 2 Φf®klg(xr)\F;8r. fprg has a converging subsequence, fprng converging to





have E(prn;xrn) = 0;8n and so by continuity of E also for (p;x). Since prn 2 F;8n, p 2 F, also and hence
x 2 B.
It follows from Hildenbrand(1972) Lemma 1, p.55 that Φf®klg has a measurable selection. Let f®kl(d)g 2 Aq




is a measurable selection from Φf®kl(d)g,
we have p 2 Ψq(®)
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